Evaluating Pakistan's Attack on the Taliban

There has been much talk lately about the Taliban being withing 60 miles of Islamabad and the eventual Pakistani counter-attack. The Economist looked at the offensive and tried to decipher was it a real counter-attacks, or a bit of a dog and pony to show to re-assure western Countries:

On April 26th, Pakistan gave a glimpse of this: by launching an attack on the Pakistan Taliban in parts of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) recently overrun by the militants. It began with an assault in Lower Dir, near the border with Afghanistan, in which the army claims to have killed 70 militants and lost ten soldiers, and which displaced some 30,000 people.On April 28th the army launched a bigger offensive in the scenic Buner valley, just 100km (62 miles) from Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. As helicopter gunships and jets strafed their positions, the Taliban took around 70 policemen and soldiers hostage. But showing more resolve than it had previously, the army said airborne troops had been dropped behind Taliban lines and freed 18 of the captives. Major-General Athar Abbas, a military spokesman, said 50 militants had been killed in the first two days of fighting. He said it would take a week to drive the Taliban out of Buner.

Under pressure, the military acted, the next question was how real a threat to capturing Islamabad is there from the Taliban:

Some Western diplomats considered this scaremongering. The Taliban are near Islamabad because the capital, a 1960s new town, was built close to the rugged border area where these Pushtun tribesmen live. But there is no chance of their seizing Islamabad. If, unthinkably, the disparate warlords who make up the Pakistan Taliban were to mass together for a frontal attack, Pakistan’s army, which is 620,000-strong and well-drilled for conventional warfare, could crush them. Indeed, many pundits reckon that an Islamist takeover in Pakistan would be possible only with the army’s support.

Indeed, I do fear the military in exchange for keeping their perks and privileges might throw in its lot with the Islamists and use the Koran to provide some form of legitimacy to their rule. To me that is the real threat, thing of a hybrid monster with conventional weapons, insurgent tactics, and international terror groups, all working for the same goals, armed with Atomic Bombs no less. The problem now is who is going to fill the void after the Pakistan military leaves these areas?
Update:
It appears a major offensive is soon to begin.