Greece and Spain both suffered S&P downgrades this week — Greece to junk — as bondholders realized the obvious. The nations cannot raise taxes and cut spending fast enough to pay their debt without killing off economic recovery.But nothing has shaken another massive debt market: American municipal bonds.
You might think that investors would pause before pouring money into obligations of muni debt, particularly obligations of California, New York or Illinois. Like mid-2000s homeowners, state and local governments spent boom years using illusory gains to justify ever-higher spending and borrowing.
By 2008, state and local debt rose to $2.2 trillion — 49% higher, after inflation, than in 2000. The biggest partners in profligacy also promised more benefits to public workers in the future.As the recession's severity became apparent, officials kept borrowing: States have already borrowed another $15 billion for operating costs over the past two years.
Yet gatekeepers consider municipal bonds low-risk. "We do not expect that states will default on general-obligation debt, even under the most stressed economic conditions," analysts at Moody's wrote in a February 2010 report.
Consider this though, there are plenty of people out there betting that municipalities will default:
As U.S. cities and towns wrestle with financial problems, investors are finding a new way to profit on their misery: by buying derivatives that essentially bet municipalities will default.
These so-called credit default swaps are basically insurance contracts that have long been available to protect holders of corporate bonds against default. They became available a few years ago for municipal debt, allowing investors to short sell—or bet against—countless cities, towns and bridges, and more than a dozen states, including California, Michigan and New York.
The derivatives are still thinly traded, but their existence has the potential to make investors skittish about the issuers of the bonds that underlie them. That has been the case for issuers ranging from Greece to Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis. When the price of this insurance goes up, nervous investors have sold off securities issued by these entities.
The proliferation of the derivatives is angering treasurers around the country, who say the derivatives are sending a negative message and possibly driving up their costs of borrowing at a time when they need all the help they can get. California planned to send out letters as soon as this week to big Wall Street firms that sell its bonds, seeking in-depth information about their roles in selling derivatives.
"Firms that are underwriting our bond sales are then telling the purchasers maybe they need to buy a CDS reflecting some risk," California Treasurer Bill Lockyer said in an interview. "They are speaking with two tongues, and we want to find out whether that impacts us in an adverse way."
In recent weeks, the treasurer received initial information in letters from the banks, but he is probing further to find out who is buying the products and whether the bank is trading in-house for its own profit. The underwriters who have been questioned are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Merrill Lynch and its parent, Bank of America Corp.; Citigroup Inc.; and Barclays PLC. All the banks told California their activity is making it easier for the derivatives to trade without large prices moves and that they aren't driving up the issuers' borrowing costs.
As detailed here, many of the highlighted banks have been involved in significant legal issues, civil and criminal in nature and if muni-finances are "too big to fail", who is betting they will? Even worse, who might want them to for a direct financial gain? Of course the other side of the argument is that derivatives actually lower borrowing costs for governments.
